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Introduction 
It is a very dangerous thing to ve~t in the same judge 
power to decide on law, and also general powers in 
equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into 
his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason 
or opinion may dictate. 
I 
I. ,, 
I 
! 
From Equitable Relief to Public Policy 
U ntil little more than two decades ago the fed-eral judiciary held a position in the American political order quite removed from the policymaking function. Although the courts 
exercised immense political power in determining 
the constitutionality of legislative and executive ac-
tions, that power was essentially proscriptive. Since 
then, the judiciary has begun to exercise more than 
judgment in a good many instances, overflowing its 
former banks by offering prescriptive decrees in 
many areas of sensitive social policy. By doing so, it 
has opened itself to soundly reasoned criticism from 
nearly every quarter. 1 
With increasing frequency the federal judiciary 
has been assuming a new, positive, posture. From 
the opinions of Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,* and Chief 
Justice Burger in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, to Judge Frank Johnson in 
Wyatt v. Stickney, Judge Virgil Pittman in Bolden v. 
City of Mobile, Alabama, and Judge Frank Battisti 
in United States v. City of Parma, the trend is clear: 
there is a willingness to enter into the "political 
thicket" and attempt to straighten out what the 
more representative institutions have allegedly 
failed to accomplish. The recent trend has been for 
the judiciary to move from a position of decreeing 
what the government cannot do to a position of de-
creeing what the government must do. 
*Full citations are given in the List of Cases, preceding the 
Bibliography. 
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The most controversial prescriptive judicial decrees of the Supreme 
Court-Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, Green v. 
County Sc/wot Board of New Kent County, Alexander v. Holmes County 
Board of Education, Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, Keyes v. 
School District No. I, Denver, Colorado, Lau v. Nichols, Milliken v. 
Bradley (I and II), and Hills v. Gautreaux-all have rested ostensibly 
upon the same foundation: the equity power created by Article III of the 
Constitution. But they have rested on an understanding of that power that 
is new. Beginning with the two Brown v. Board of Education cases (1954 
and 1955), the Court fused the idea of equity to the newly discovered right 
of psychological equal protection-a right of protection against a "feeling 
of inferiority"-to forge a new constitutional standard of equality by the 
law, rather than equality before the law. In particular, equity, which was 
originally understood as a judicial means of offering relief to individuals 
from "hard bargains" 2 in cases of fraud, accident, mistake, or trust, and 
as a means of confining the operation of "unjust and partial laws," 3 has 
lately been stretched to offer relief to whole social classes. The original 
understanding of equity has been transformed into a "sociological" 
understanding that has undermined not only equity as a substantive body 
of law but the idea of equality as well. 
In the process of this transformation of the idea of juridical equity, there 
has been a substantial loss of judicial appreciation for the great tradition of 
equity jurisprudence. The Court, in using its "historic equitable remedial 
powers'' to impose its politics on society, is often forced to ignore or deny 
the great tradition of equitable principles and precedents, which had 
always been viewed as the inherent source of restraint in equitable dis-
pensations. 
I 
In the Constitution, the equity power is not well defined; indeed, it is not 
defined at all. But the lack of constitutional definition in no way obscures 
what the Framers meant by "all cases in law and equity." For the Fram-
ers, as for us, the word was backed by several centuries of jurisprudence. 
The substantive concept of juridical equity-from its first formulation 
by Aristotle, through the Roman tradition of Cicero and Justinian, 
through the efforts of such English and Scottish students of jurisprudence 
as Ranulph de Glanville, Henrici de Bracton, Christopher St. Germain, 
Sir Edward Coke, Sir Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Lord Karnes, and 
Sir William Blackstone, and up to the Founders of the American 
republic-remained virtually unchanged. From one century to the next 
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From Equitable Relief to Public Policy 
the idea was transmitted, with nearly every writer paying tribute to Aris-
totle's first pronouncement. In the Rhetoric Aristotle had pointed out: 
For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that 
goes b.eyond the written law. These omissions [in the written law] are 
sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of legisla-
tures; inv.oluntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary 
when, bemg unable to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a 
universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most 
cases ... ; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the pos-
sibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is nec-
essary, one must have recourse to general terms. [1374a] 4 
Law, by its nature general, is limited and suffers the possibility of pro-
moting injustice as well as justice in particular instances. It is necessary 
that there be a continuing opportunity for deliberation to reassert itself in 
the realm of positive law. Equity is the power to dispense with the harsh 
rigor of general laws in particular cases. But equity is always to be under-
stood as the exception rather than the rule. Equity, from the beginning, 
was viewed as a part of the law, not as some power superior to it. 
Throughout the vast tradition of equity jurisprudence one maxim was held 
to be indispensable in the administration of equity: Aequitas sequitur 
legem-"Equity follows the law." Equity was necessary, in many cases, 
to fulfill the law. The law, being by its nature general in scope and appli-
cation, always admits of exceptions. However, when the law did provide 
an adequate and complete remedy for alleged wrongs, an equity court was 
understood to have no authority to embellish or replace it. In particular, it 
was the common belief that a court of equity had no control over "im-
perfect obligations, resting upon conscience and moral duty only, un-
connected with legal obligations." 5 
The major innovations in equity jurisprudence, following Aristotle, 
were in the procedural rather than the substantive realm. In Rome there 
first appeared a special office for the administration of equity. This idea 
was brought to its most complete institutional expression in England with 
the creation of the office of the chancellor, or "Keeper of the King's 
Conscience." Throughout the entire history of procedural innovations in 
equitable adjudication it was understood that equity is a potentially 
dangerous source of arbitrary discretion; and when kings came to be 
replaced by constitutions, the procedural arrangements for the dispensa-
tion of equity had to be reconsidered in light of this potential danger. 
In America the debate was largely between those who followed the 
opinion of Sir Francis Bacon and those who followed that of Henry 
Home, Lord Karnes. Bacon advocated a rigid separation between courts 
5 
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of law and courts of equity. Karnes believed, to the contrary, that the 
separation of law from equity was a chimerical idea and that justice, if it 
were to be served, demanded that each court enjoy a mixed jurisdiction, 
reaching to both law and equity. 
These older debates between Karnes and Bacon over juridical equity 
were essentially different views on how to restrain this necessary but 
potentially dangerous power. One way differentiated equitable and legal 
pleadings, making clear that the former was a kind of last resort when the 
latter had been exhausted. The other way consolidated law and equity but 
in the process bound equity by rules and precedents through a law or 
"science" of equity, thus rendering it self-regulating. 
But however glaring the differences over the procedural questions, 
Bacon and Karnes were united on a deeper, substantive level. Beneath 
their differences was a crucial underlying agreement, that equity, though 
necessary to correct the harshness of strict law, could degenerate into 
arbitrary judicial discretion. Both believed that equity must be carefully 
restrained and hedged in order to curb its excesses without undermining 
its essential function. 
The Founders chose to follow the tradition of Lord Karnes. In the 
Philadelphia Convention they moved quickly and relatively quietly to vest 
in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as might be created, a 
judicial power that would extend to all cases in law and equity. The 
procedures for administering the power of equity-like the rest of the 
judicial power-the Convention chose to leave to Congress. 
When the proposed Constitution emerged from the Convention, the 
fusion oflaw and equity was assailed by such keen-eyed Anti-Federalists 
as "Brutus" and the "Federal Farmer." To "Brutus," the provision for 
the judicial power would allow judges to "explain the constitution ac-
cording to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or 
letter," thereby granting them power "to mould the government into 
almost any shape they pleased. " 6 
The "Federal Farmer" was equally wary of the proposed judiciary. In 
his view his countrymen were "more in the danger of sowing the seed of 
arbitrary government in this department than in any other." The lack of 
precision in defining the limits of equity in the Constitution was a serious 
defect that would contribute to "an arbitrary power of discretion in the 
judges, to decide as their conscience, their opinions, their caprice, or their 
politics" might demand. For if a judge should find that the "law restrain 
him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his 
reason or opinion may dictate. " 7 
Whatever their reservations about the judicial power generally or the 
equity provision in particular, the Anti-Federalists were unable to thwait 
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From Equitable Relief to Public Policy 
ratification of the Constitution. But, once it had been ratified, a good 
number of them took their places in the first Congress and there were able 
to influence to some degree the procedural arrangements of the new 
judiciary. . 
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress effected somethmg of a balance 
between those who advocated a hard separation of law from equity and 
those who argued for an unrestricted use of equity as a judicial tool in 
each federal court. While the act extended equity jurisdiction to all federal 
courts, it also established a firm rule as to when causes in equity could 
and could not be sustained. In the Process Act of 1792, Congress allowed 
that equity procedures in the federal courts would be "according to the 
principles, rules and usages which belong to a court of equity as con-
tradistinguished from a court of common law." This act, as passed, gave 
the Supreme Court the discretion to make such regulations as it thought 
proper to prescribe equity procedure in the lower courts. In that year the 
Court, under Chief Justice John Jay, announced that in making such 
regulations it would "consider the practices of the Courts of Kings Bench 
and Chancery in England as affording outlines." 8 
The safety provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and th~ subsequent 
Process Acts was to separate rigidly the procedure of eqmty pleadmgs 
from the procedure of pleadings at law while leaving each court with the 
jurisdiction to entertain both. The draftsmen of these bills saw this. pro-
cedural distinction as necessary if equity was to be kept from becommg a 
dangerous source of unfettered judicial discretion. This understa;iding 
was generally embraced by the judiciary as a fundamental maxim of 
American law. 
In the nineteenth century, however, there began a movement to codify 
the common law in an attempt to reduce judicial discretion and render the 
administration of justice more efficient. A cardinal tenet of the Codifica-
tion Movement was the merger of equity proceedings with legal pro-
ceedings. In time the Codifiers gained ground, and the merger of law and 
equity in the name of judicial efficiency and simplicity became. common-
place. In 1938 the trend peaked in the Supreme Court of the Umted States 
with the adoption of the New Rules of Civil Procedure. In that body of 
rules the formal distinction between equity procedures and legal proce-
dures was abolished. 
By combining the procedures of law with procedures in eq~ity, the 
Court in effect ignored the dangers of equity that had always lam at the 
core of its procedural arrangements. With the Rules of Civil Procedure of 
1938 the Court made it convenient for judges to switch from their shoes 
of la:V to their shoes of equity whenever they found the law too restric-
tive, just as the "Federal Farmer" had warned. In its effort to reduce 
7 
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equity to a safe and more certain code, the Court opened the door for 
the power of equity to be exercised with a disregard for precedent or 
procedure. 
II 
The underlying assumption of American constitutionalism is that there is 
an intimate connection between procedure and substance, and that the 
institutional arrangements of a polity have a direct bearing on its sub-
stantive actions. This understanding lay at the heart of the original sep-
aration of law and equity. By maintaining a procedurally distinct judicial 
system, equity would be kept from flowing over and giving the law an 
undue liberalism, and law would be kept from rendering equitable dis-
pensations too rigidly bound. Each had its place in the American system; 
and to maintain its authority, each had to be kept in its place. The merging 
of equity procedures and legal procedures had one overwhelming effect. 
Without the rigid separation of pleadings, it was only a matter of time until 
equity no longer would be held as a necessary substantive body oflaw and 
would be viewed as merely another set of procedural remedies available 
to a court. Restraint through adherence to principle and precedent would 
be lost. 
In Porter v. Warner (1946) the Court seemed on the verge of giving 
equity a radical expansion by arguing that when the "public interest is 
involved in a proceeding" the equitable powers of the federal district 
courts "assume an even broader and more flexible character than when 
only a private controversy is at stake." But it was not until 1955 that it 
became clear just how fluid equity had become. The Court, in the second 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas case, fashioned a new 
understanding of the Court's equitable remedial powers. The central 
thrust was that in the place of an individual adverse litigant the Court 
placed an aggrieved social class. Its remedies would be decreed, no longer 
for the individual who had been injured by the generality of the law, but 
rather for whole classes of people on the basis of a deprivation of 
rights-a deprivation that was provable only by resort to the uncertain 
realm of psychological knowledge and sociological inference. Further, the 
Court went beyond decreeing discriminatory laws unconstitutional and 
restricting their operation: it attempted to fashion broad remedies for 
those so deprived. 
What is particularly striking about Warren's invocation of the federal 
equity power in Brown (II) is that, while he spoke of the· "traditional 
attributes" and guiding "principles" of equity being controlling, he then 
ignored most of the more substantial equitable principles in writing his 
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decree. The effect was to present the lower federal courts with a virtual 
blank check. 
The understanding of equity expressed in Brown (II) and its progeny 
differs from the traditional understanding in seven essential ways: 
Old 
Equitable and legal procedures 
separated. 
Applied to specific individuals. 
Focused on specific concrete rights, 
especially property . 
Usually exercised in a proscriptive 
way to block the enforcement of an 
unjust law or action. 
Largely bound by precedent. 
Required an irreparable injury that 
was immediate, great, and clear. 
Restricted by the federal principle. 
New 
Equitable and legal procedures 
merged. 
Applied to broad social groups. 
Focused on more abstract rights, 
especially equality. 
Greater emphasis on broad reme-
dial mandates, hence generally 
exercised in a prescriptive way. 
Largely unbound by precedent. 
Irreparable injury generally proved 
by a resort to social-science hy-
potheses. 
Not restricted by the federal prin-
ciple. 
Since Brown, the Court has continued to expand, and to confuse the 
pub.lie perception of, its power of equity. The result has been to substitute 
social-science speculation for precedent and principle as the standard of 
both constitutional meaning and equitable relief. This new tradition of 
sociological equity has baffled even those of its defenders who have 
sought to define its scope. Chief Justice Burger was thus driven to con-
clude in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education (at 
15-16) that "words are poor instruments to convey the sense of basic 
fairness inherent in equity. Substance, not semantics, must govern, and 
we have sought to suggest the nature and limitations without frustrating 
the appropriate scope of equity." The problem, of course, is that words 
are all we have. One must at least suspect that, if the limits of any gov-
ernmental power cannot be clearly and forcefully articulated, then there is 
something desperately wrong with our understanding of that power. 
III 
The most prominent feature of this new concept of equity is the object 
addressed. Equity has now.become the means of "reconciling public and 
private needs." What at the Founding was thought to offer relief to indi-
viduals from "hard bargains" has become a judicial power to draw the 
9 
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line between governmental powers and individual rights and to attempt to 
create remedies for past encroachments against whole classes of people. 
The Court in Brown (II) established the ''equitable principles'' doctrine to 
guide the judiciary in "fashioning and effectuating" their desegregation 
decrees, and that doctrine has survived through Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg and is still alive and well in Milliken v. Bradley (II) and 
United States v. City of Parma. But this new equity power in no way need 
be limited to the desegregation cases. One need only recall Benjamin 
Cardozo' s observation that it is the "tendency of a principle to expand 
itself to the limit of its logic" 9 to catch a glimpse of the possibilities. 
The Court's fusion of equity to equal protection in the Brown cases has 
led to a distortion of its interpretations of the Constitution. It has led the 
Court to attempt to fashion broad equitable remedies for society from the 
particular cases or controversies brought before it. Equity, originally and 
historically a power addressed toward individuals, has been stretched to 
cover entire social classes. As a result, the individual adverse "litigant, 
though still necessary, has tended to fade a bit into the background." rn 
And the Court has been steadily moving into the realm of legislation. 
Broad decrees "fashioned and effectuated" for the whole country on the 
basis of "equitable principles" are, in essence, judicially created social 
policies. 
An older political science assumed that the formulation of policies that 
were to reach the lives of the people were more safely written by the duly 
elected representatives of the people. Through a rather intricate system of 
representation, it was believed that all the conflicting opinions, passions, 
and interests of the citizens could be filtered upinto the legislature and, by 
a process of coalescing and politics, be fashioned into a public policy that 
resembled, at least somewhat, the public interest. It was never assumed 
that the judiciary was competent for that task. As Nathaniel Gorham 
pointed out to the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention, 
"Judges ... are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of 
the mere policy of public measures." 11 James Madison made the same 
point in The Federalist, No. 49, when he argued that the judiciary "by the 
mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, 
are too far removed from the people to share much in their preposses-
sion." 12 
The formulation of public policy is an expression of a political will. To 
be legitimate, such policies must reflect the will of the people, not the 
independent will of their deputies. The judiciary has no means available 
for ascertaining the public will in any meaningful sense. It is not, strictly 
speaking, a representative body. It must be assumed that the Court, when 
it moves to make decisions with respect to such matters as immediate 
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integration of schools, busing, low-income-housing development, and 
remedial-education programs, is exercising not merely judgment: it is 
making policy choices; it is exercising its own will. It is exercising a 
power that the Constitution denies to it. The Court, under the guise of its 
"historic equitable remedial powers," has been endeavoring to formulate 
public policies for which it lacks not only the institutional capacity but, 
more important, the constitutional legitimacy. 13 
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